四, 监理人合谋:软信息情况
软信息是否会减少监理人报告对业主的价值?我们下面讨论在软信息条件下,也就是在监理人不能够证实其信号的情况下,监理人信息对业主的价值以及业主在该信息结构下的效用水平。当合谋对联盟成员有利时,承包商和监理人会改变报告的信息,这与硬且可伪造信息的情况时相同;其次,监理人也有可能因存在获利空间而单方面的改变信息。在完美贝叶斯均衡条件下,业主能获得硬且可伪造信息的效用。
假设监理人向建设业主的报告为(,)(0,,),承包商的努力为e为eargmax t(m)-e/2,其策略是()=(a(,),e(,),监理人的策略是()=r(),最优契约(m,x)=(e,t,w),m=( a,r)有以下取值:
当r时,(m,x)= (0,0,0)
当=(,r)且r(0, ,)时,(m,x)=(e,t,0)
当=(,r)且r(0, ,)时, (m,x)=(e,t,k(t-t)
当监理人的信息是软信息时,如果监理人的信号具有噪音(<1),委托人可以获得与硬且可伪造信息条件下相同的效用。当信号无噪音,委托人获得与硬且不可伪造条件下相同的效用。
如果建筑业主事先没有考虑合谋因素,则承包商与监理人有可能事后达成信号造假的协议而获利,这使得监理人与承包商联盟有“伪造”对其自身有利信号的激励,尤其是在合谋联盟无法对其报告提供任何证据的软信息条件下。但当生产成本随着努力水平而变化,监理人的信息有噪音时,软信息产出将少于硬且不可伪造的情况。,这是因为努力的扭曲(低效率承包商)会带来租金的扭曲(高效率的承包商)。在软信息条件下,联盟伪造信息而获取租金的可能性降低了监理人信息的价值。但是,当边支付的效率低时(k<1),或者当监理人的信号噪音过大时(高于某个阈值),监理人的信号对业主也是有利的,,此时业主可以比不雇佣监理人获得更多的利润。
当监理人和承包商对其私有信息真实报告时,建筑业主对承包商努力的承若构成一个均衡战略,而该战略是满足合谋的防范条件,在这一状况下没监理人和承包商都没有偏离的动机。如果其报告与监理人的信息不同(),合谋联盟得不到任何收益。承包商也没有改变关于其类型的报告积极性。
五,结论
本文利用委托人-监理人-代理人模型,研究了在软信息条件下,监理人报告信息对建筑业主效用的影响,并认为当在存在努力扭曲与信息噪音时,业主在硬信息条件下的福利大于软信息的情形。但当监理人信息无噪音时,两者信息结构下的效用将相等。当监理人的信息有噪音时,差异化的信息租金将有助于减少努力扭曲。但本文对软信息条件下,监理人报告信息噪音阈值的设定和边支付的无效条件缺乏深入研究,这也是今后研究的方向。
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